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Abstract
This paper aims to map out practices of political financing in 
Indonesia from the political to the socio-historical perspective. 
Arguing about the party financing and the corruption of 
politicians and the parties, this paper also proposes about strategies 
at the individual level for performing financing politics, as well 
as factors that help to explain their performance. It compares 
cases in three different periods of Indonesian history: the post-
independence, the Suharto (New Order) era, and reformasi after 
the fall of Suharto in 1998. This paper discusses and analyses the 
financing politics belonging to the political and socio-historical 
perspective, the issue of financing politics, the results of mapping 
students’ theses from three universities in Java together with 
relevant papers by LIPI (the Indonesian Sciences Institute), 
and directly presents three case studies of individual performing 
financing politics. Two of the case studies concern with politicians 
from the post-independence and Suharto era, while the third 
concerns a member of the city of Solo’s local parliament. This 
paper shows how financing politics would be no longer relevant, 
as the cultural capital, political capital, and social capital also 
may contribute in supporting one’s political career.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, democratisation has become the 
major factor behind political changes in the ‘Global South’. These 
changes have been significant to the existence of political parties 
and yet, in terms of financial subsidies, many political parties in the 
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64 Global South still rely on government support in countries such as 
in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Bryan & Baer, 2005; 
Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002; Mwangi, 2008). Under authoritarian 
regimes, governments in these countries played an important role 
in financing political parties through various subsidies. Hence, 
government support has been significant for the sustainability of 
political parties and democracy in the Third World.
Due to various budgetary constraints, governments have 
reduced subsidies for political parties (Biezen, 2004). Ithas often 
led to an increase in illicit practices in political financing, including 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism, since the political party’s need 
to survive comes at a significant cost. This phenomenon is also 
evident in Indonesia, one of the largest democratic countries in the 
world. Following a series of funding cuts, political parties have been 
forced to find alternative sources of income to cover their increasing 
expenses, especially during elections. Often, these new sources of 
revenue are securedthrough illegal means and activities, at least in 
the case of Indonesia (Mietzner, 2007).
This article aims to map out practices of political financing in 
Indonesia from the perspective of ‘political’ and ‘socio-historical’ 
schools of thought. The ‘political’ approach refers to activities of party 
financing that are related to democratisation in general and explores, 
for example, the extent to which issues of party financing support or 
hinder democratisation. The approach applied here is more a legal-
formal one. In its approach, the ‘political school’ focuses on parties 
as the unit of analysis. The second approach explores the issue of 
financing parties from a sociological point of view. It examines how 
politicians (or political activists) come into being, how they finance 
their political activities and how they sustain their political careers. 
The reason for including these two approaches is because there has 
been a domination of the political school in the study of ‘financing 
politics’. Within this approach, at least in the Indonesian case, the 
focus of study has,in the main, been on party financing and the 
corruption or ill behaviour both of politicians and the parties. In this 
article, however, we argue that the issues of political financing do not 
just concern the study of parties and their behaviour. 
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The discussion can be broadened by including the sociological 
approach of examining how individuals finance their political 
activities. By broadening the discussion, the article proposes a more 
nuanced overview of the topic: it is not just about the corruption of 
parties, but also about strategies at the individual level for performing 
politics, as well as factors that help to explain their performance. The 
initial plan for this study was to compare cases in three different 
periods of Indonesian history: the post-independence,the Soeharto 
(New Order) era, and reformasiafter the fall of Soeharto in 1998. 
However, important individual sources for the first period were 
difficult to find as most of them have passed away. It was instead 
decided to map the studies on financing politics in Indonesia by 
combining a literature review of graduate theses along with the case 
studies (one being based on empirical studies). 
This article consists of four sections. The first section covers 
the main literature on financing politics belonging to the political 
and socio-historical schools. The discussion also includes literature 
on political economy which discusses the issue of financing politics 
indirectly. The second section introduces the analytical instrument to 
be used—‘types of capital’—in exploring the case studies.The third 
section turns to a discussion on the results of mapping students’ theses 
fromthree universities in Java together with relevant papers by LIPI 
(the Indonesian Sciences Institute). We collected 256 theses with 
titles containing the words ‘political parties’ and ‘financing parties’. 
Indeed, the theses on the topic of financing politics demonstrate 
the dominance of the political approach. The fourth section covers 
three case studies—two at the national level and one at the local 
level. Two of the case studies concern politicians from the post-
independence and Suharto eras, while the thirdconcerns a member 
of the city of Solo’s local parliament. Through these three cases, we 
seek to substantiate our argument on the merits of the sociological 
approach. 
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Political approach
Finance is a vital aspect of politics and political parties in 
particular (Mwangi, 2008). Furthermore, parties need funding in 
order to survive, compete, and perform their democratic functions 
(Bryan & Baer, 2005). In many developed countries, such as those 
in Europe, state subsidies began in the late 1970s. Previously, all of 
a political party’s costs were sourced from the party’s membership. 
It was possible to mobilise funds due to the nature and form of 
parties in many European countries, where a majority at that time 
were mass-based parties. Over the past few decades, this type of party 
system has shifted to the point where such parties are increasingly 
difficult to find (Pierre et al., 2000). In the developing countries of 
Africa, South Asia, Latin America and East Europe, there has been 
a shift towards a multi-party system in which most political parties 
are supported through state subsidies (Austin & Tjernström, 2005).
‘Political financing’ is defined as the money needed to flow 
legally or illegally into the various elements of political systems—
the politicians, the administrations, pressure groups and, not least, 
party coffers. However, experts have suggested that it is difficult to 
distinguish the term ‘political financing’ from ‘political finance and 
money in politics’, ‘political money and politicians’ money’, and ‘the 
cost of democracy’ and ‘cost of democratic politics’. The existing 
literature suggests various meanings of ‘financing political parties’, 
including: (i) activities of financing political parties in terms of the 
parties’ internal management, such as seeking funds for parties’ 
activities(Austin & Tjernström, 2005; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002),(ii) 
state subsidies for political parties (Pierre et al., 2000; Biezen, 2004), 
and(iii) corruption in political parties (Biezen, 2004; Pierre et al., 
2000). The first group of studies examines various strategies that 
parties employ in order to fulfil their routine expenses. The second 
examines the pattern of the relationship between the state and political 
parties through the issue of state subsidies, as well as examining the 
pattern of behaviour of politicians and conducting cross-national 
comparative studies on the pattern and amount of subsidies givento 
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political parties (Biezen & Kopeckỳ, 2007). The third focuses on the 
assessment of the way parties seek funds and the ways in which these 
funds areobtained, whether legally or by violating laws. 
In the context of Indonesia, studies on financing politics have 
so far focused on state subsidies and the corrupt nature of political 
parties(Mietzner, 2007; Sulaiman & Klinken, 2007; Hadiz & 
Robison, 2004; Lay, 1993). Mietzner (2007) relates the issue of state 
subsidies to political parties, the shift of the Indonesian party system 
and the more illicit practices of politicians and political parties. He 
points out that since the 1999 elections, Indonesian political parties 
faced more challenges to maintaining office, including intensifying 
competition due to the steep increase in the number of political parties 
(from three parties in 1997 to 24 parties in the 2009 elections). At 
the same time, there has been an increasing frequency of legislative, 
presidential and local elections. The rising number of elections has 
significantlyincreased the funds needed by political parties. 
Electoral democracy is a cost-intensive activity, both from the 
perspective of the committee, i.e. the Indonesian government, as well 
as the participants, i.e. Indonesian citizens who want to run for public 
office. The total budget allocation for the general elections in 2004 
and 2009 was IDR 4 trillion (US$ 40 million) and IDR 6.4 trillion 
(US$ 64 million) respectively. For the forthcoming 2014 elections, 
funding allocation from the national budget is set at IDR 8.1 trillion 
(US$ 81 million). At the local level, the funding required for holding 
local elections is of course less in comparison to the national one. 
To give an example, Central Java province, the province with the 
largest population in Indonesia, allocated IDR 169 billion (US$ 
16.9 million) for the 2009 elections. 
At the individual level, to run for office at the district/city 
level in the 2009 elections required funds of between IDR 200-
400 million. The amount depends on the size of the region and the 
size of the population, the two major contributing factors to the 
cost of campaign activities. To run for mayor, a candidate should 
prepare around IDR 3 billion (US$ 0.3 million) for a small town 
in Central Java with a population below 400,000 and a moderately 
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For the presidential campaign, candidates are expected to provide 
between IDR 140-500 billion (US$ 14-50 million).
Based on government regulation No. 51/2001, parties obtained 
subsidies from state worth up to IDR 1,000 per vote in the 2004 
elections. This was the first systematic state subsidy for political 
parties in Indonesian history. However, political parties were later to 
face a new challenge in the form of declining subsidies for contesting 
election. This was due to the changing formula for delivering state 
subsidies—from vote-based to seat-based, as regulated by government 
regulation No. 29/2005. As a result, total state subsidies have fallen 
89 percent since before 2005 from IDR 105 billion to IDR 10.5 
billion (Mietzner, 2007, p.244). These factors have forced political 
parties to seek alternative sources of funding in order to maintain 
their activities. The need to find other sources of funding, according 
to Mietzner, often leads to corrupt practices, such as money politics 
and the use of state facilities during elections.
Table 1
Comparison in the decline in state subsidies for political parties between 
the 2004 and 2009 elections 
Political parties Amount of state subsidies
(000.000 in IDR)
1999 2004
Demokrat NA 2,338
Golkar 23,741 1,623
PDIP 35,689 1,574
PKS 1,436 886
PAN 7,528 677
PPP 11, 329 598
PKB 13,336 555
Gerindra NA 501
Hanura NA 423
69
PCD Journal Vol. III No. 1-2 2011
The corruption of state funds by political parties and politicians 
also takes place at the local level. State subsidies for local political 
parties are sourced from the local budget (APBD). A study conducted 
by Sulaiman and van Klinken (2007) revealed corrupt practices 
by local politicians in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
(NAD). For example, Abdullah Puteh was a party activist from the 
well-established Golkar party. With the intention of strengthening 
his own position, he utilised all the resources available to himby 
taking advantage of his connections with the party’s leaders in order 
to maintain power. Shortly after being elected, governor of Aceh, 
Puteh, divvied up influential positions and lucrative projects to 
members of his family and cronies who helped him winning the 
gubernatorial election. However, Puteh was accused of corruption 
and an investigation revealed how he employed his long-established 
connections with top figures in Golkar, such as former chairman, 
Akbar Tanjung, to help him out of difficulties. Only after Yudhoyono 
came to power and Akbar Tanjung lost his influential role as chairman 
of Golkar, was Puteh brought to trial for corruption.
Evidence of the ill-behaviour of politicians and political parties 
can also be foundin other parts of the archipelago. Buehler and Paige 
(2007, p41) studied a local election in Gowa District, South Sulawesi, 
where they found evidence that local party elites manipulated the 
candidates who ran in the district head elections as ‘cash cows’ with 
which to increase funding for their respective political parties. Choi 
(2007) studied the 2005 gubernatorial elections in Riau, where he 
found inconsistencies within party coalitions that demonstrated how 
they had been pragmatic and ad-hoc in their alliance despitea lack of 
ideological similarities. He also found that vote buying was rampant 
(2007: 340-341). All these examples evidence the dominance of local 
elites in the practice of local democracy in Indonesia. 
The state’s role in financing politics
The importance of state subsidies on the life of political parties 
in Indonesia can hardly be separated from the dominant role of the 
state in Indonesia in economic development and politics over the 
three decades prior to political reform in 1998. The dominant role 
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finance their politics. It is not just typical of the Indonesian case as 
this can be found in Asia in general and Southeast Asia, a region 
widely recognised for intermingling between politics and business, 
in particular. Here, business actors are also political actors (Yoshihara 
1989; McVey 1992, Robison 1986, Robison and Rosser 1998; Hadiz 
and Robison 2004). The literature has focused more on business 
actors. However, because business actors are also political actors who 
needed to finance their political activities, we have read this literature 
through the lens of financing politics. 
Experts have argued that this intermingling between business 
and politics, or between money and politics, is a consequence of the 
state’s dominance—which is in turn also part of the colonial legacy 
(Robison, 1986). Scholars that have often been labelled ‘culturalists’ 
have advocated that the intermingling between business and politics 
is something inherent in the Asian culture, an aspect of ‘Asian Values’ 
predominantly relating to Confucianism. In exploring the roles of 
Confucianism in South Korean development, List-Jensen (2008, 
p.11)summarises the essential values of Confucianism as: 1) hierarchy 
as the core notion in the human relationships between generations, 
within families and between the ruler and the ruled; 2) its emphasis 
on family, groups, norms, social harmony and moral, political, and 
economic order. 
Let us explore the first understanding of the historical factor. 
Following independence throughout Asia, newly born states 
attempted to fulfil their sovereign dreams. These dreams were difficult 
to fulfil due to an abundance of problems faced as part of colonial 
legacies. In the economic field, economies consisted of an abundance 
of an indigenous work force working on extractive activities sufficient 
only for subsistence, while industrial sectors remained in the hands 
of former colonies. Furthermore, the economic functions remained 
under the control of former colonial powers or minority groups, 
whilepoverty and inequality were common in post-colonial countries 
in East Asia (Robison, 1986; Lindblad & Post, 2009). In the social 
and political realm, civil society organisations were weak or poorly 
developed and political actors were fragmented. There was no other 
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actor that could solve those post-colonial problems other than the 
state. As a result, the state has been dominant in many Asian countries. 
Business actors and political actors would go to the state for help. 
It has made them dependent on the state for accessing resources, 
something that has happened throughout the post-colonial period. 
Following the independence and during state developmental, 
business people were mostly actors with close connections to 
national elites. They were mostly former independence fighters 
that had assumed power after independence. In order to maintain 
the resources they had gained from the state, business actors then 
become politicians, or at least they maintained proximities with the 
state. Robison (1986) labelled these people with double roles—those 
of politician and business actor—as ‘bureaucratic capitalists’. 
In post-crisis Indonesia, Hadiz and Robison (2004, p.221) 
suggest that these networks have survived and transformed themselves 
into ‘predators’ and ‘private oligarchs’. However these politicians 
turned business actors are labelled, they are all in essence point to the 
success of these business actors in Southeast Asian countries as being 
due to their activities in politics—and it has endured under various 
political regimes. One of the reasonsfor the survival of old political 
networks is perhaps linked to the high cost of electoral democracy. 
Ithas opened up a kind of chain of supply and demand, between 
candidates, who are eager to assume public position but who do 
not have sufficient capital, and the business actors, the capitalists, 
who are mostly part of the old political networks. In the context 
of the Indonesian Chinese conglomerates, the business communities 
that used to be protected by the ruling party Golkar during the 
New Order through the patronage system lost their old patrons.
However,they still want to keep their businesses running. Political 
reform has paved the way for their involvement in politics by either 
becoming politicians themselves or through the use of societal space, 
such as the media (Chua, 2010, p. 216). Chua also suggests that since 
political reform, it is much easier for business tycoons to influence the 
policy-making process in Indonesia through politics,particularly the 
legislative body. Moreover, Indonesia is heading toward ‘a political 
system significantly defined and molded by the interest of capital’ 
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the ethnic-Chinese conglomerates have become part of the electoral 
democracy, both directly by becoming politicians or indirectly 
through lobbying and taking on roles in societal organizations.
To summarize, the topic of ‘financing politics’—from the 
perspective of the political approach— is mostly concerned with 
the role of the state in democracy, and particularly with the state 
subsidies in the life of political parties. It also concerns the role of 
capitalists and their attempts to influence the policy-making process. 
Socio-historical approach
The second approach to the literature is spread across different 
areas of study, but mostly situated in the area of political economy. 
In the case of Indonesia, studies focus on relations between the state 
and political actors and the extent to which actors benefit from 
economic policies and capitalist development in Indonesia. Within 
the framework of this relationship, the literature has also addressed 
how actors—political and business actors—accumulate power and 
wealth through the assistance of the state, and how these actors 
establish their political power. We have suggested that this literature 
can be framed within the discussion of ‘financing politics’, albeit 
indirectly. From these materials, the social origins of politicians—
showing how individual politicians have come into being, what 
factors have supported or impeded their existence and the success of 
their careers—can be traced. In addition, certain historical contexts 
surrounding the emergence of politicians are important for analysing 
politicians and, especially, how they finance politics. It provides a 
more sociological point of view of the topic of financing politics. By 
broadening the discussion, we have stepped into line with Biezen’s 
argument that suggests: “The scope of studying political finance 
[…] should thus be seen as broader than merely involving illicit 
transactions” (2003, p 12). 
Another scholar that can be useful for understanding the 
practice of political financing is Bourdieu (1986), who is famous for 
his notion of capital. According to Bourdieu, there are four types 
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of capital. The first is economic capital, which he describes as assets 
such as material wealth in the form of property, money or shares 
that may be converted into money.The second is social capital.The 
third is cultural capital, and the fourth is symbolic capital. Bourdieu 
defines social capital as the “sum of the resources, actual or virtual, 
that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992, p119). Cultural capital is “the formal educational credentials 
that an individual possesses and the more intangible complex of 
values and knowledge of cultural forms in his or her behaviour” 
(1986).Symbolic capital refers to legitimate authority in the form 
of prestige, honour, reputation, and fame (Stokke: 2002, p. 9-10). 
Political capital finally is symbolic capital applied in political field.
Among the four types of capital, the most famous is the notion of 
social capital. Bourdieu and the American sociologist James Coleman 
(1993) are the two scholars who first suggested the notion of ‘social 
capital’, although they refer to different meanings. Regardless, it 
has become currency in the social sciences and beyond, especially 
in development studies, andhas been widely adapted by multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank in their development strategies 
(Fine 1999), alongside the contribution of Robert Putnam (1993). 
There are two views on the argument of social capital. Coleman 
views the notion of social capital as an individual attribute, Putnam 
regards it as a collective one, while Bourdieu seems to refer to neither 
as he focuses the notion of capital in unity with his other notions 
of ‘field’, ‘practice’, and ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1992). To link these 
debates on ‘capital’ in the context of ‘financing politics’, the term 
is used pragmatically, and mostly in relation to how an individual 
accumulates and makes best use ofsocial capital for the accumulation 
of power and wealth. 
As mentioned above, Bourdieu also coined the concept 
of  ‘field’, which he suggested is part and a parcel of the notion 
of ‘capital’ (Bourdieu: 1992). He defines field as a “network, or a 
configuration, of objective relations between positions”. Capital 
exists within a particular field. Thus, ‘field’ and ‘capital’ are relational 
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has certain volume and structure, and it evolves over time (ibid, 
1992: 99). Using the same line of argument, in the context of 
social movements, Stokke observes the dynamic dimensions of 
capital (Stokke 2002). He suggests that by its very nature, capital 
does not activate automatically. Specifically on economic capital, 
Stokke suggests that it is “not in itself enough to gain power within 
the fields of art or education, but economic capital may be used to 
acquire the specific cultural capital that is the basis for legitimate 
authority within these fields”.  He also notes that capital needs to be 
activated by actors. Although Stokke formulates it in the context of 
agency in social movement, he emphasises the dynamics of capital 
that this article proposes. Furthermore, it brings us to the issue of 
what activates the capital to be beneficial, or in Bourdieu’s term, the 
“convertibility of element of capital”. 
The analytical tools on the types of capital that one has possessed 
and the role of actors in activating is what guides our study in this 
article. We have identified types of capital that politicians utilise and 
spend to finance their political costs, covering all types of capital 
as aforementioned. Our identification is historical, meaning that 
it is situated within certain political regimes, or what we refer to 
as the ‘field’. We have observed the moment when the capital was 
firstly accumulated, occurring in one particular period, how it was 
activated and, finally, how the exercise of capital within a specific 
field resulted in successfully supporting one’s political and economic 
career in the later periods. 
Financing Politics in Indonesian Graduate Theses1: Dominance 
of the Political Approach
This section maps out and discusses findings on undergraduate 
and postgraduate theses written on the issue of financing politics. 
1 We thank our research assistants who conducted library researchat the three 
state universities in Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Jakarta: Wening Hapsari and 
Chindy Grafia Farasati Harahap at Gadjah Mada University; Juwita Hayyuning 
at Airlangga University, Surabaya; Muhammad YusronHalim at University of 
Indonesia and LIPI, Jakarta.
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The operational definition of ‘financing politics’ is the involvement 
of money during elections at all administrative levels—in the village, 
district/municipality, province, and national levels.  It includes vote 
buying, costs for candidacy in political parties, costs of election 
campaigns, and the role of investors in elections. Desk studies in 
three different universities in Java, the top three university in 
Indonesia, with their well-known departments of political science—
University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta; Gadjah Mada University 
(UGM) in Yogyakarta and the University of Airlangga (UNAIR) in 
Surabaya, East Java—together with LIPI (the Indonesian Sciences 
Institute). In terms of periodisation, we attempted to collect all of 
the theses published in the early 1990s until 2010, covering a 20 
year span. However, the archive systems in each of the university 
libraries arevaried. UGM still has hard copies of theses from the mid-
1990s, while UI and UNAIR have only kept copies since early 2000. 
It was decided, however, to allow the different time spans as the study 
concerned only with three universities and other data from LIPI.  
Of a total 256 theses, 13 percent of itwas written during the 
Soeharto era and 87 percent during the post-Suharto era. Clearly, 
there has been significant increase in interest on the theme of political 
parties since the fall of Suharto. It perhaps relates to the more open 
and relaxed political life in Indonesia as well as the vibrancy of 
political parties post-Suharto era. Previously, studies on political 
parties were limited, as there were only three parties allowed—and 
they were controlled by the government, while elections were held 
with expected results. 
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76 Graph 1: Undergraduate and graduate theses based on sources (Three 
Universities and LIPI)
The total 256 theses keywords of ‘political parties’ were 
categorised based on V.O Key’s (1963: 163-164) subdivision on 
studying parties, namely: (i) party as an organisation,(ii) party 
in government,(iii) party in electorate.  In essence, these three 
categories refer to the ‘function of parties’ in the three arenas of 
government, organisation (internal parties), and in elections. In the 
first arena, the parties’ functions refer to internal organisation—to 
recruit political leaders, train and educate cadres, articulate party 
interests, and aggregate voter interest. The second category covers 
functions such as creating a majority in government, structuring 
power in the legislative body through monitoring, controlling, and 
incentive distribution, implementing and controlling policies issued 
by government, and controlling the government’s daily function. In 
essence, a key function is to ensure that all kinds of policies issued 
by the government will be to the benefit of parties and the parties’ 
constituents. In the last arena, parties function as a tool with which 
to simplify political options that are available hence it will be easier 
for voters to understand the complexity of political issues, and to 
mobilise voters and to educate the citizens (Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000: 5-10). 
For the first category—‘party as organisation’—we found 110 
theses, the largest number. Yuliani (1994), for example, wrote about 
political recruitment by the provincial branches of Partai Demokrasi 
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Indonesia2 (PDI). Simbolon (2005) wrote about Golkar (Golongan 
Karya) party presidential recruitment for the 2004-2009 tenure. 
Hasyim (2006) wrote on elite conflict within the Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP) in 2005. The second largest theme was ‘party 
in electorate’, which accounted for 89 theses. Haryanto (2010) wrote 
on campaign strategies adopted by the new political party, Gerindra 
(Gerakan Indonesia Raya), in the 2009 legislative elections. Davina 
(2009) wrote about media strategies during the 2008 gubernatorial 
election in East Java Province. Another example under the theme 
of ‘party in electorate’ was a thesis written about the victory of the 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the 2004 legislative election in 
Jakarta (Azlina 2005).The last group of theses focused on ‘party in 
government’, which accounted for 18 theses. Examples include: the 
ways in which factions and political parties influence the performance 
of local parliament in Sambas District, West Kalimantan, in 
formulating local regulations (Perda) (Bujang 2002). Another 
example is a thesis on the Yudhoyono administration’s opposition to 
the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) in 2009 written 
by Dora (2009).
Graph 2: Undergraduate and graduate theses based on themes in Key’s 
categorisation
2  In the 1999 elections, the PDI changed its name to PDI Perjuangan (Indonesian 
Democratic party for Struggle).
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financing political parties, and all of these were published afterthe 
fall of Soeharto. This means that during the Soeharto era there was 
hardly any academic writing on this theme. In turn, the five theses 
on financing politics focused mostly on the role of ‘money politics’ 
(Kosandi 2002; Sudarmadji 2002). In the first study, factors found 
to contribute to the exercise of money politics were the pragmatic 
behaviour of citizens, the economic context of the area (villages were 
known as poor areas), cultural factors that suggest vote buying is 
a normal thing to do, and weak law of enforcement. The second 
thesis on money politics was written at the University of Indonesia 
in 2003 concerning the 1999 elections in a suburb of Jakarta. The 
thesis explored the role of state apparatus—the administrators 
or bureaucracy—in supporting the incumbent candidate who 
was formerly part of such apparatus. Support was given through 
government programmes such as the social safetynet programme, 
or (JPS—Jaring PengamanSosial), softloan schemes channelled 
through cooperatives or the Farmers Credit Union (KUT—Kredit 
Usaha Tani), infrastructure provision through the GeneralWorks 
Department,and the urban poverty reduction programs such as the 
P2KP (Proyek Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Perkotaan). All of these 
programmes were claimed as the initiatives of a particular candidate. 
The third thesis, written as part of the National Security 
postgraduate program at UI in Jakarta, highlighted the impact of 
money politics in village head elections in Sleman, Yogyakarta, and 
the extent to which it affected the village’s security (Sudarmadji 2002). 
The paper concluded that there was hardly any correlation between 
the practice of money politics and village security, because this would 
depend on various factors such as: (i) the quality of the village head 
after the election; (ii) the performance of the elected village head to 
deliver services for the villagers; (iii) the vast social networks of the 
village head to pacify any possible conflict that emerged.  
The fourth thesis on the strategies of candidates in local elections 
in Sleman, Yogyakarta, suggests that money plays an important role in 
three phases of local elections, namely the candidate’s recruitment to 
a political party, campaign activities, and the day of the election. The 
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money spent in these three phases was sourced from the candidate, 
the candidate’s family, businesspeople, social organisations that the 
candidate was connected to, and, in the case of incumbent candidates, 
from government programme budgets. The last thesis was written by 
a student at Airlangga University on capital and village elections in 
Wonotengah Village in Kediri, East Java (Kholan 2009) who suggests 
that it was the role of capital that contributed to the victory of the 
village head.
As these findings show, the political approach dominates studies 
on political financing in Indonesia. They all suggest that financing 
politics means the corrupt behaviour of politicians and parties. 
This result is expected because it is the dominant understanding of 
financing politics in Indonesia, and the academic world seems to 
follow this main discourse. 
Socio-historical Approach on Financing Politics: Case Studies
This section explores the socio-historical approach to the study 
of financing politics. It consists of three case studies on the careers 
of two politicians at the national level, and one at the local level. 
The cases studies offer an attempt to compliment the theses written 
by graduate students at the top three universities, including thesis 
documented by LIPI, given that none of them touched on the 
socio-historical approach to the issue of financing politics. From the 
three case studies, we demonstrate how this topic goes beyond the 
discipline of political science, and beyond the behaviour of parties 
and politicians, including their ill behaviours. The topic of financing 
politics is situated in a wider socio-political context that influences 
the way politicians behave. Itis thus being a macro approach to the 
study of financing politics. We concentrate on three politicians from 
the beginning of their careers. Three types of capital, as mentioned 
earlier, will be explored in analysing their careers. 
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Soedarpo Sastrosatomo: From Social-cultural Capital to 
Economic Capital 
Soedarpo Sastrosatomo (1922-2007) was a political activist 
during the period of independence inthe mid-1940s. He became 
a successful entrepreneur and was labelled as the Indonesian ‘king 
of shipping’ due to his giant international shipping sector business 
interests. He was a Sumatran-born ethnic Javanese affiliated to 
the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI), a 
party banned in the 1960s. Together with his brother, Soebadio 
Sastrosatomo, Soedarpo acted as liaison between Sutan Sjahrir, a 
PSI leader later to become the first Indonesian prime minister under 
Sukarno (Anwar 1995: 107-108). At that time, the Sastrosatomo 
brothers were both medical students in Jakarta, although neither 
succeeded in finishing their courses. They, together with the late 
Soedjatmoko (former Indonesian ambassador to the UN), were 
known as ‘The Sjahrir Boys’ (Anwar, 2009: 232), a label that reflected 
their proximity to the first prime minister. Because of his activities in 
business and in politics, a Jakarta-based English language newspaper 
labelled him as a ‘patriotic businessman’ in its obituary news when he 
passed away in 2007 (Jakarta Post, 23 October, 2007).
A political event that was crucial for the future career of 
Soedarpo was the Linggardjati conference attended by Indonesia 
and The Netherlands convened to settle a number of economic 
issues, such as the ownership of enterprises belonging to the former 
colony after independence. In addition, his networks of friends 
included high-profile figures in Indonesian politics and throughout 
a vast international network. For example, the late Soemitro 
Djojohadikusumo, a Dutch-trained leading economist who was a 
finance minister during Sukarno era, and was an economist advisor 
during Suharto era, also assisted him in gaining international 
exposure. 
When the Indonesian political system adopted the parliamentary 
system in 1950 and Sutan Sjahrir, the PSI leader, became prime 
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minister, Soedarpo’s political career continued. He was appointed as 
the head of foreign correspondents at the ministry of foreign affairs 
to serve journalists who came from across the world to cover news on 
the newly born republic. His English was good—thanks to the BBC 
and Voice of America, which he listened regularly in his childhood. 
He became an Indonesian representative at the UN Security Council 
in New York from 1948-1951 to defend Indonesia’s diplomacy 
against The Netherlands (Robison, 1986).  
All his political activities allowed him to enjoy proximity with 
the national elites (Wie, 2008, p. 134-138). It was his social capital. 
He had also been active in the PSI since its establishment. It exposed 
him to political figures such as Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX, the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta, who after the independence was a Minister 
of Defence (Robison, 1986: 55-56; Muhaimin, 1990: 226). These 
figures were his political capital. 
The PSI won five parliamentary seats and ten Constitutional 
Assembly (Konstituante) seats in the first elections in Indonesia (Feith, 
1955). In parliament, the PSI controlled the ministries of Trade 
and Finance, the State Bank and all of the state-owned companies 
(Muhaimin, ibid). The PSI asked Soedarpo to manage Indonesian 
export commodities such as coffee, rubber and opium (Wie, 2008: 
p.131-132). Previously, he had established an enterprise in the export 
and import sector called N.V Soedarpo in 1952. The five seats that 
PSI won helped his business. At that time, the newly born republic 
had just launched a nationalistic economic programme called the 
‘Benteng’ programme. It was an economic programme set out to 
facilitate the emergence of indigenous entrepreneurs by providing 
them with state protection.3 In addition to his export-import 
enterprises, he also owned a license for importing cars with brands 
including Dodge, Chrsyler, and Jeep Willys Overland. His expanding 
business interests can’t be separated from his activities in politics. “It 
3 The protection aims to support entrepreneurs to compete with existing former 
Dutch economic power represented by the ‘big-five’ of Dutch companies and 
the Chinese Indonesian enterprises, which during the colonial time played a 
role as middle traders between the Dutch colonial and the native Indonesian. 
Soedarpo’s enterprise was set in the context of state’s protection in the 1950s.
Financing Politics in Indonesia
82 was alleged in parliament that N.V Soedarpo, along with other PSI 
companies, had received contracts to import vehicle and arms for the 
military…”  (Robison 1986, p 56). On 1 March 1953, he established 
a shipping company called the International Shipping and Transport 
Agency (ISTA), and later the Samudra Indonesia Corporation. 
The company was the first international shipping company owned 
by an indigenous Indonesian. Because of his success he became 
known as the ‘king of shipping’ in Indonesia. His business interests 
developed considerably, consisting of 32 enterprises covering trade 
and commerce, banking, insurance, leasing and consumer credit, 
and transportation (Robison, 1986, p.55).
As politics shifted back from the parliamentary to the 
presidential system in 1959, power returned to President Sukarno. 
Itbrought about the decline of the PSI’s political power and, later, to 
the outlawing of the party in the 1960s. Sjahrir, the party leader, was 
imprisoned. Soedarpo officially resigned from politics whereupon he 
fully converted his social and political capital into economic capital. 
He tried to be independent from the state’s protection, and his 
business has survived until today,although Soedarpo passed away in 
2007 (Anwar, 2003, p.236).
The story of Soedarpo highlights the case of a former political 
activist during the period of independence thatsucceeded in 
transform himself into a successful businessman. He managed to 
capitalise on his cultural, social, and political capital, turning it 
into economic capital. His cultural capital was his educated family 
background. As part of an educated family, he had beenexposed to 
the international milieu, including listening to the BBC from the 
time he was small. It thenfurther developed when he entered medical 
school at Indonesia’s top university, joining other students from quite 
similar social economic backgrounds. The cultural capital that he 
owned later developed into social capital as he constructed networks 
of friends at medical school. Later this social capital was activated 
into political capital when he became a PSI politician and part of a 
circle of people who had access to power and resources. His period as 
political activist was a moment in which he accumulated social and 
political networks both at domestic and international levels, which 
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later became important for his business.
The timeSoedarpo entered into university and during the struggle 
for independence contributed to the conversion of his cultural capital 
into social capital. Later, the political field added more volume to 
his capital. His accumulation of cultural, social, and political capital 
resulted in him having strong economic capital, which helped in 
successfully establishing his business interests in various sectors. We 
could speculate that if the fields were different, possible types of 
capital that Soedarpo had to develop would have been different. He 
may not have been as successful as he in fact became. 
The story of Soedarpo does not link directly to the issue of 
financing politics in the way that we define the term today, that is 
activities—both legal and illegal—that involve capital to support 
a political career. After independence, there was no such thing as 
‘money politics’. It was not an issue at that time. Political parties had 
not yet institutionalised, and things remained chaotic. Soedarpo was 
already part of the inner circle of the party when it was established. 
He needed no financial support to be in that circle. His political 
career did not develop because he financed it, but mostly because of 
his cultural capital as an educated Indonesian. After independence, 
the newly born country was in need of highquality human resources 
of which it lacked at that time.  What Soedarpodid as a PSI politician 
was to serve his nation in various positions to which he was assigned, 
and these were mostly abroad. By serving as the party’s representative, 
he cultivated and accumulated social networks. Later, when he signed 
off officially from politics to become a businessman, the social and 
political networks were useful for his business expansion. In short, 
Soerdarpo did not finance his political activities, but it was quite the 
other way around: it was his politics that financed him or supported 
him to be a successful businessman, domestically and internationally.
Thiscase of Soedarpo offers a nuanced view on the issues of 
financing politics. The dominant assumption about financing politics 
claims the existence of established political parties and a political 
system, with individuals attempting to become a part of them and 
also to play a role in them.  Yet, as this case shows, the independence 
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such a context, the financing of politics operates differently in 
terms of the way types of capital work in supporting the career of a 
politician. Within the dominant understanding of financing politics, 
mostly equated as ‘money politics’, economic capital is assumed to 
support political careers. The term money politics also assumes that 
there is a certain ‘sequence’ to the way capital works. First of all, one 
should at least have one type of capital to be involved in politics. One 
should have political networks (political capital) to enter politics—
and, from this, one could develop economic capital. Or, one should 
have economic capital to enter politics—and, from this, increases 
this economic capital. 
Case 2
Fahmi Idris: From Political Capital to Economic Capital
The second is the case of Fahmi Idris (b.1943). Idris was the 
minister for manpower and transmigration in 2004 during the 
Habibie presidency and industrial minister during Yudhyono’s 
presidency in 2005. Idris was a student activist in 1966, a period 
of political transition from Sukarno’s presidency to Suharto’s New 
Order. He was the chair of the student organisation at the Faculty of 
Economics at the University of Indonesia in 1965-1966, and was at 
the forefront of student demonstrations demanding the outlawing of 
communism. He was also active in the Islamic Student Organisation 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). 
After he graduated from university, he went into business by 
using political connections he had established when he was a student 
activist. In 1984, he joined Golkar, the ruling party of the Suharto 
regime. As a politician, he was appointed national chair of the 
party between1998-2004. As he began to get involved in business, 
he was active in the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs Association 
(HIPMI-Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia) and ICMI 
(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), the Muslim intellectual 
association. HIPMI was a lobby group that ‘defended’ indigenous 
entrepreneurs, mostly against ethnic Chinese. ICMI was a lobby 
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group that attempted to influence policy making processes by 
advocating Muslim interests in general and in business in particular.
Alongside friends and associates—who were also business 
people connected to Golkar—Idris established the company PT 
KODEL, (an abbreviation of Kongsi Delapan, meaning ‘the eight 
members of cooperation’). The other founders were Aburizal Bakrie, 
Ponco Sutowo, Sugeng Suryadi, Abdul Latief, Mahir Al Gadri, Said 
Umar Husain, and Yan Damardi. These were all part of the second 
generation of indigenous entrepreneurs who became politicians. 
They attained business success during the Suharto era (Kano 2007, 
p.276) and obtained access to various business opportunities during 
the second oil boom in the 1970s (Sato 2003, p.18). It was a major 
turning point for the expansion of KODEL’s business (Raillon 2001).
Idris’ activities in Golkar have provided him with opportunities 
in various fields of businesses including construction, import and 
export, insurance (Maskapai Asuransi Parolamas), agrochemicals (PT 
Parama Bina Tani), hotels and tourism (PT Permadani Khatulistiwa 
Nusantara), property (PT Permadani Propertindo Developer), 
trading and investment (PT Kodel Investindo Nusa), and the 
automotive industry (PT KramaYudha).4
Political economists have identified FahmiIdris and other 
Golkar businessmen turned politicians as part of the monopolistic 
and oligopolistic economic system that existed under Suharto. 
He is also considered an example of ‘client capitalists’—a type of 
indigenous capitalist who emerges as a business actor not because of 
their entrepreneurial skills, but mostly due to politics and proximity 
to the state (Robison 1986; Muhaimin 1990: 190). 
Idris’ case shows how being a student activist during a period of 
transition of power within a regime aligned to the ‘winning’ political 
power can be beneficial to establishing economic capital in a later 
stage of  life. Idris established political capital as a student activist, 
as he networked among politicians. Later, he activated the political 
network to build a new economic network, opening the way for him 
4 His profile is compiled from internet-based sources such as www.tempointeraktif.
com/.../nrs,20040925-01,id, www.tempo.co.id/ang/min/02
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financed his political activities through his political networks. The 
field he engaged with was rather different from Soedarpo’s. Idris’ 
field was the New Order regime, a relatively politically settled regime 
compared to the period marked by the independence struggle. Also, 
the types of fields that Idris engaged in were relatively stable, namely 
the political regime of Soeharto. In comparison, Soedarpo experienced 
at least two types of ‘fields’: the struggle for independence and post-
independence. The types and varieties of fields that one experiences, 
we have suggested, influence the volumes and structures of capital 
that one possesses. Thus, Idris’ experience in managing his capital 
was different from Soedarpo’s due to different types of fields they 
both experienced. 
Case 3
YF Sukasno of Solo, Central Java: Social Capital as a Mean of 
Financing Politics 
This section explores empirical evidence that demonstrates 
the third type of financing politics in Indonesia, especially in post-
Suharto Indonesia. If in the cases of Soedarpo and Idris above, the 
contexts were the early years of Indonesian independence and the 
political transition from Sukarno to Suharto, the following casehas 
its place in the on-going political processes of the post-Suharto era. 
While exploring this case, we will also touch upon the existing party 
political and electoral system in which they are situated, as these 
partly contribute to their political behaviour. 
Y.F. Sukasno (b.1959) is the head of local parliament 
(DewanPerwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) in Surakarta, also 
known as Solo, Central Java. His party is the Indonesian Democratic 
Party for Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP), 
which has 15 of a total 40 seats in the Solo DPRD. He has been in 
politics since the party was still named the Indonesian Democratic 
Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) during the New Order era 
at the beginning of the 1980s. 
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Sukasno started his career from below. He was the chair of the 
PDI at the village-branch level in 1982. Twenty years later he became 
a member of the DPRD, replacing a PDIP cadre who had passed 
away. He ran for parliament in 2004 and was successful. During 
the 2004 election, the electoral system was based on the ranking 
numbers in the list of candidates (nomo rurut), in which the higher 
the candidate’s number, the greater the possibility of becoming a 
member of parliament. Alongside this number candidacy system, 
voters would vote for a political party and then it was up to the 
party to decide who from its cadres would take a seat in the DPRD. 
The system has changed since 2009 and now candidatesaredirectly 
elected to the DPRD (suara terbanyak). Thus, the voters now elect 
both the party and the candidate. In the 2009 elections, Sukasno 
gained the third largest vote of DPRD members in Solo.
Sukasno has stated that his victory in the two elections was due 
to the social activities that he has engaged in since the early 1980s. “I 
have always been with my constituents all of my life, and there is no 
need for me to buy their votes. They know me and they acknowledge 
what I have done for them all this time”, he said in an interview. 
When asked how much he spent to finance his 2009 campaign, he 
claimed that the figure was around IDR100 million (US$10,000). 
This figure is not as high as that of the other candidates, who spent 
four times that amount. 
The basic calculation of the money needed by candidates relates 
to the so-called ‘BPP’ electoral system, or bagian pembagi pemilih 
which refers to the proportion of seats in the legislative body, along 
with the total population eligible to vote in a particular area. The 
BPP in Surakarta city is 5800. The closer a candidate reaches the 
BPP, the better the chance of becoming a member of parliament. 
Now let’s calculate the funds required by a candidate to spend based 
on the BPP. If a candidate wants to reach half of the BPP—around 
3000—they ideally need to provide a set of campaign attributes such 
as t-shirts, the cost for meetings, and cost of political rallies. The cost 
of one t-shirt with the picture of candidate is around IDR15,000 
(US$1.5). To reach half of the BPPrequires a supply of 3000 t-shirts. 
In addition to this, the candidate needs a media campaign that 
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considerations include petrol and snacks for visitors at the candidate’s 
residence. In total, a candidate needs around IDR100,000 (US$10) 
per potential voter. Therefore, to garner half of the BPP, one must 
spend IDR300 million (US$30,000).  
This number is a cost projection that a candidate estimates 
for the cost of running for a legislative position. Since there is no 
standard for the spending per potential vote, and candidates have no 
clue of how much their competitors will spend, the sums involved 
can be much higher. Each candidate will, therefore,spend as much as 
possible. The election system based on securing the highest number 
votes consumes large funds. Thus, this system has increased the 
financing of politics among the parliamentary candidates since 2009. 
Only candidates with considerable funds are likely to be successful 
and win a seat in parliament. “I can never compete against people 
with money,” said Sukasno. 
Sukasno also suggests that this system allows investors to finance 
the political costs of parliamentary candidates. To reduce this threat, 
Sukasno suggests that the political system must become socially 
rooted. 
When they come to your place for help, you help them out, 
regardless whether it was a campaign period or not. Itis what I 
have been doing all this time. I have always attended wedding 
ceremonies in the area of my constituents (Daerah Pemilihan 
or Dapil). I respond to the problems my people encounter 
in accessing health care and education. I hang out with them 
routinely. I don’t even need to print my personal picture in the 
area where constituents live to promote myself. I have always 
been with them. I have done it since I have been active in the 
PDIP for more than 20 years now. My social activities reduce 
my political costs. I think this is what politics is about—to 
be with the people you represent, not just buying their votes. 
Because of that the voters mock you by asking for more, but not 
electing you on the D-day” (Interview, Solo).
Sukasno’s case demonstrates how a local politician is able to 
finance his political activities through the social networks he has 
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accumulated. His strong social capital has reduced the cost of his 
political campaign—without which he would not have become 
successful to become a member of local parliament. This does not 
mean he has paid nothing for his political activities, just that it has 
been much less than what it would have cost had he not nurtured his 
social network. In terms of economic capital, Sukasno claims that he 
is just an ordinary person, meaning he does not have a great deal of 
economic capital. 
In this case, the use social capital—being rooted among the 
people—is established first as a political strategy. Sukasno invests 
in people through his good deeds, and they later vote for him at 
election time. In the meantime, his field is different to the fields 
of Soedarpo and Idris. Indonesian politics after Suharto is politics 
at the local level. This is the field of Sukasno, contributing to his 
volume and structure of capital. Due to his lack of economic capital, 
in order to win at the local level he has to maximise his social capital. 
Otherwise, he would never be able to compete with politicians who 
possess stronger economic capital. 
From the three cases explored above, there are at least four main 
arguments we can draw. First, at the level of individual cases, there 
are more nuances of how politics is financed. It is both a combination 
of capacity to mobilise strategies of access to the state’s resources, 
as well as individual resources. Furthermore, these strategies are 
situated within particular historical trajectories: post-independence, 
the New Order, and post New Order era. Second, the level at which 
these strategies are mobilised, whether it is at the national or local 
level, contributes to the types of strategies deployed in financing 
the politics. Third, each of the historical trajectories requires certain 
types of capital. Post-independence Indonesia allowed someone with 
strong political capital to entrench the state’s resources, and even to 
have the ability to convert this political capital into economic capital. 
Under the authoritarian New Order regime, political capital—
or being close to the elite circle of the ruling party, Golkar—has 
been an important factor in financing politics. During post-Suharto 
Indonesia, especially at the local level—reducing the cost of politics 
can only be done when one is embedded socially within one’s own 
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or national level contributes less to success in politics.  Fourth, the 
three case studies also demonstrate how the state’s role in financing 
politics operates differently. It has been substantial only during the 
authoritarian regime of New Order, while it has been less marked 
during both the post-independence as well as in post-Suharto era. 
To address the three cases on a more abstract level and to link 
the cases with the main approach of studying the topic of financing 
politics, i.e. the political and socio-historical approach, it is evident 
that the two approaches operate as a combination of the two, at least 
at the individual level. It is not just about how states support political 
activities, or how capitalists attempts to influence policy-making 
processes in order to ensure access to state resources; it is also about 
capacity at the individual level to play outand activate the type of 
capital they possess to finance their political activities.
Conclusion
This article has explored financing politics from the perspective 
of political and sociology schools of thought. It has aimed to broaden 
the perspective of the study beyond a political science point of view. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the political school 
dominates the study of financing politics. Itis clear by looking at the 
theses of Indonesian students at the graduate level. A majority of the 
students talk about financing politics as ‘money politics’—which is 
considered a bad influence on democratic life. Students from political 
science departments emphasise the output of the political system 
while ignoring the background. Also, the theses assume that the 
bad behaviour of practicing money politics is rooted in the immoral 
behaviour of politicians. Implicitly, this would suggest that as long 
as there is no change in behaviour, the pattern of money politics in 
financing politics will never change. 
Secondly, the sociological approach shows that activities of 
financing politics are not just about individual behaviour. As case 
studies reveal, it has something to do with the macro perspective–
namely the historical context and existing environment in which 
91
PCD Journal Vol. III No. 1-2 2011
politicians live, or also dubbed the ‘field’.  Within this field, instruments 
of capital with which to increase political influence are varied. There 
are three models of the way in which capital operates: (i) the case of 
Soedarpo shows how cultural capital (being an educated and well-
connected elite in a newly born country) can become a source for 
supporting political and business careers; (ii) the case of Idris shows 
how political capital can be a source for supporting political and 
business careers; (iii) the case of Sukasno shows how social capital 
can be a source of supporting a political career. Being one of a few 
elites in the period of Indonesian independence was a field for 
Soedarpo to becoming part of the national elite, and allowed him 
to establish and expand his social, political, and economic networks. 
Being an activist during the regime’s transition strengthened Idris’s 
political capital. The third case demonstrates how being a senior local 
politician with weak economic capital forced Sukasno to be socially 
embedded in society as part of a strategy to adjust to the high costs 
of the Indonesian election system since 2009-his field.
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